{"date_updated":"2023-02-23T13:10:56Z","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","month":"01","title":"Securing every bit: Authenticated broadcast in radio networks","publisher":"ACM","article_processing_charge":"No","page":"50 - 59","doi":"10.1145/1810479.1810489","status":"public","publication_status":"published","day":"01","conference":{"name":"SPAA: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures"},"date_created":"2018-12-11T11:48:20Z","citation":{"short":"D.-A. Alistarh, S. Gilbert, R. Guerraoui, Ž. Milošević, C. Newport, in:, ACM, 2010, pp. 50–59.","mla":"Alistarh, Dan-Adrian, et al. Securing Every Bit: Authenticated Broadcast in Radio Networks. ACM, 2010, pp. 50–59, doi:10.1145/1810479.1810489.","ama":"Alistarh D-A, Gilbert S, Guerraoui R, Milošević Ž, Newport C. Securing every bit: Authenticated broadcast in radio networks. In: ACM; 2010:50-59. doi:10.1145/1810479.1810489","ieee":"D.-A. Alistarh, S. Gilbert, R. Guerraoui, Ž. Milošević, and C. Newport, “Securing every bit: Authenticated broadcast in radio networks,” presented at the SPAA: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, 2010, pp. 50–59.","ista":"Alistarh D-A, Gilbert S, Guerraoui R, Milošević Ž, Newport C. 2010. Securing every bit: Authenticated broadcast in radio networks. SPAA: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, 50–59.","chicago":"Alistarh, Dan-Adrian, Seth Gilbert, Rachid Guerraoui, Žarko Milošević, and Calvin Newport. “Securing Every Bit: Authenticated Broadcast in Radio Networks,” 50–59. ACM, 2010. https://doi.org/10.1145/1810479.1810489.","apa":"Alistarh, D.-A., Gilbert, S., Guerraoui, R., Milošević, Ž., & Newport, C. (2010). Securing every bit: Authenticated broadcast in radio networks (pp. 50–59). Presented at the SPAA: Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/1810479.1810489"},"publist_id":"6902","abstract":[{"text":"This paper studies non-cryptographic authenticated broadcast in radio networks subject to malicious failures. We introduce two protocols that address this problem. The first, NeighborWatchRB, makes use of a novel strategy in which honest devices monitor their neighbors for malicious behavior. Second, we present a more robust variant, MultiPathRB, that tolerates the maximum possible density of malicious devices per region, using an elaborate voting strategy. We also introduce a new proof technique to show that both protocols ensure asymptotically optimal running time. We demonstrate the fault tolerance of our protocols through extensive simulation. Simulations show the practical superiority of the NeighborWatchRB protocol (an advantage hidden in the constants of the asymptotic complexity). The NeighborWatchRB protocol even performs relatively well when compared to the simple, fast epidemic protocols commonly used in the radio setting, protocols that tolerate no malicious faults. We therefore believe that the overhead for ensuring authenticated broadcast is reasonable, especially in applications that use authenticated broadcast only when necessary, such as distributing an authenticated digest.","lang":"eng"}],"author":[{"id":"4A899BFC-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0003-3650-940X","first_name":"Dan-Adrian","last_name":"Alistarh","full_name":"Alistarh, Dan-Adrian"},{"full_name":"Gilbert, Seth","last_name":"Gilbert","first_name":"Seth"},{"first_name":"Rachid","last_name":"Guerraoui","full_name":"Guerraoui, Rachid"},{"first_name":"Žarko","last_name":"Milošević","full_name":"Milošević, Žarko"},{"full_name":"Newport, Calvin","last_name":"Newport","first_name":"Calvin"}],"type":"conference","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"_id":"756","year":"2010","extern":"1","date_published":"2010-01-01T00:00:00Z","oa_version":"None","acknowledgement":"The authors would like to thank Prof. Guevara Noubir for his useful comments on earlier\r\ndrafts of this paper."}