{"publication_identifier":{"isbn":["9783030755386"],"issn":["03029743"],"eissn":["16113349"]},"date_published":"2021-05-11T00:00:00Z","project":[{"call_identifier":"H2020","_id":"2564DBCA-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","name":"International IST Doctoral Program","grant_number":"665385"},{"_id":"258AA5B2-B435-11E9-9278-68D0E5697425","call_identifier":"H2020","name":"Teaching Old Crypto New Tricks","grant_number":"682815"}],"main_file_link":[{"open_access":"1","url":"https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/670"}],"status":"public","ec_funded":1,"day":"11","alternative_title":["LNCS"],"publication":"Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021","quality_controlled":"1","user_id":"2DF688A6-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","abstract":[{"text":"Automated contract tracing aims at supporting manual contact tracing during pandemics by alerting users of encounters with infected people. There are currently many proposals for protocols (like the “decentralized” DP-3T and PACT or the “centralized” ROBERT and DESIRE) to be run on mobile phones, where the basic idea is to regularly broadcast (using low energy Bluetooth) some values, and at the same time store (a function of) incoming messages broadcasted by users in their proximity. In the existing proposals one can trigger false positives on a massive scale by an “inverse-Sybil” attack, where a large number of devices (malicious users or hacked phones) pretend to be the same user, such that later, just a single person needs to be diagnosed (and allowed to upload) to trigger an alert for all users who were in proximity to any of this large group of devices.\r\n\r\nWe propose the first protocols that do not succumb to such attacks assuming the devices involved in the attack do not constantly communicate, which we observe is a necessary assumption. The high level idea of the protocols is to derive the values to be broadcasted by a hash chain, so that two (or more) devices who want to launch an inverse-Sybil attack will not be able to connect their respective chains and thus only one of them will be able to upload. Our protocols also achieve security against replay, belated replay, and one of them even against relay attacks.","lang":"eng"}],"publisher":"Springer Nature","language":[{"iso":"eng"}],"article_processing_charge":"No","citation":{"chicago":"Auerbach, Benedikt, Suvradip Chakraborty, Karen Klein, Guillermo Pascual Perez, Krzysztof Z Pietrzak, Michael Walter, and Michelle X Yeo. “Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing.” In <i>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021</i>, 12704:399–421. Springer Nature, 2021. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17</a>.","ama":"Auerbach B, Chakraborty S, Klein K, et al. Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing. In: <i>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021</i>. Vol 12704. Springer Nature; 2021:399-421. doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17\">10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17</a>","ieee":"B. Auerbach <i>et al.</i>, “Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing,” in <i>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021</i>, Virtual Event, 2021, vol. 12704, pp. 399–421.","apa":"Auerbach, B., Chakraborty, S., Klein, K., Pascual Perez, G., Pietrzak, K. Z., Walter, M., &#38; Yeo, M. X. (2021). Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing. In <i>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021</i> (Vol. 12704, pp. 399–421). Virtual Event: Springer Nature. <a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17\">https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17</a>","short":"B. Auerbach, S. Chakraborty, K. Klein, G. Pascual Perez, K.Z. Pietrzak, M. Walter, M.X. Yeo, in:, Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 399–421.","ista":"Auerbach B, Chakraborty S, Klein K, Pascual Perez G, Pietrzak KZ, Walter M, Yeo MX. 2021. Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing. Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021. CT-RSA: Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference, LNCS, vol. 12704, 399–421.","mla":"Auerbach, Benedikt, et al. “Inverse-Sybil Attacks in Automated Contact Tracing.” <i>Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2021</i>, vol. 12704, Springer Nature, 2021, pp. 399–421, doi:<a href=\"https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17\">10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17</a>."},"conference":{"start_date":"2021-05-17","name":"CT-RSA: Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference","end_date":"2021-05-20","location":"Virtual Event"},"scopus_import":"1","doi":"10.1007/978-3-030-75539-3_17","author":[{"orcid":"0000-0002-7553-6606","last_name":"Auerbach","full_name":"Auerbach, Benedikt","id":"D33D2B18-E445-11E9-ABB7-15F4E5697425","first_name":"Benedikt"},{"id":"B9CD0494-D033-11E9-B219-A439E6697425","first_name":"Suvradip","last_name":"Chakraborty","full_name":"Chakraborty, Suvradip"},{"first_name":"Karen","id":"3E83A2F8-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","full_name":"Klein, Karen","last_name":"Klein"},{"last_name":"Pascual Perez","full_name":"Pascual Perez, Guillermo","id":"2D7ABD02-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Guillermo"},{"orcid":"0000-0002-9139-1654","full_name":"Pietrzak, Krzysztof Z","last_name":"Pietrzak","first_name":"Krzysztof Z","id":"3E04A7AA-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87"},{"last_name":"Walter","full_name":"Walter, Michael","first_name":"Michael","id":"488F98B0-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","orcid":"0000-0003-3186-2482"},{"full_name":"Yeo, Michelle X","last_name":"Yeo","id":"2D82B818-F248-11E8-B48F-1D18A9856A87","first_name":"Michelle X"}],"type":"conference","year":"2021","date_created":"2021-08-08T22:01:30Z","volume":12704,"date_updated":"2023-02-23T14:09:56Z","page":"399-421","month":"05","_id":"9826","title":"Inverse-Sybil attacks in automated contact tracing","department":[{"_id":"KrPi"},{"_id":"GradSch"}],"intvolume":"     12704","oa":1,"oa_version":"Submitted Version","publication_status":"published","acknowledgement":"Guillermo Pascual-Perez and Michelle Yeo were funded by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska–Curie Grant Agreement No. 665385; the remaining contributors to this project have received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (682815 - TOCNeT)."}