Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games
Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications.
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Hübner, ValentinISTA;
Hilbe, ChristianISTA
;
Staab, Manuel;
Kleshnina, MariaISTA;
Chatterjee, KrishnenduISTA 


Corresponding author has ISTA affiliation
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Abstract
The public goods game is among the most studied metaphors of cooperation in groups. In this game, individuals can use their endowments to make contributions towards a good that benefits everyone. Each individual, however, is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. Herein, we study repeated public goods games among asymmetric players. Previous work has explored to which extent asymmetry allows for full cooperation, such that players contribute their full endowment each round. However, by design that work focusses on equilibria where individuals make the same contribution each round. Instead, here we consider players whose contributions along the equilibrium path can change from one round to the next. We do so for three different models – one without any budget constraints, one with endowment constraints, and one in which individuals can save their current endowment to be used in subsequent rounds. In each case, we explore two key quantities: the welfare and the resource efficiency that can be achieved in equilibrium. Welfare corresponds to the sum of all players’ payoffs. Resource efficiency relates this welfare to the total contributions made by the players. Compared to constant contribution sequences, we find that time-dependent contributions can improve resource efficiency across all three models. Moreover, they can improve the players’ welfare in the model with savings.
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Date Published
2025-02-07
Journal Title
Dynamic Games and Applications
Publisher
Springer Nature
Acknowledgement
This work was supported by the European Research Council CoG 863818 (ForM-SMArt) (to K.C.) and the European Research Council Starting Grant 850529: E-DIRECT (to C.H.), the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Grant Agreement #754411 and the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche (under the Investissement d’Avenir programme, ANR-17-EURE-0010), and ARC SRIEAS Grant SR200100005 Securing Antarctica’s Environmental Future (to M.K.). Open access funding provided by Institute of Science and Technology (IST Austria).
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Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. 2025. doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
Hübner, V., Hilbe, C., Staab, M., Kleshnina, M., & Chatterjee, K. (2025). Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5
Hübner, Valentin, Christian Hilbe, Manuel Staab, Maria Kleshnina, and Krishnendu Chatterjee. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature, 2025. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5.
V. Hübner, C. Hilbe, M. Staab, M. Kleshnina, and K. Chatterjee, “Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games,” Dynamic Games and Applications. Springer Nature, 2025.
Hübner V, Hilbe C, Staab M, Kleshnina M, Chatterjee K. 2025. Time-dependent strategies in repeated asymmetric public goods games. Dynamic Games and Applications.
Hübner, Valentin, et al. “Time-Dependent Strategies in Repeated Asymmetric Public Goods Games.” Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer Nature, 2025, doi:10.1007/s13235-025-00627-5.
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